Jennifer Nado has recently argued that conceptual engineers should focus on (re-)designing representations and may safely ignore issues of implementation. I make a general case for the methodological importance of implementation to conceptual engineering. Using the Social Norms Account as a foil, I argue for three claims. (1) Inquiring into methods of implementation is a theoretically challenging and philosophically worthwhile project in and of itself. (2) A sound theoretical understanding of implementation is imperative for theorists of conceptual engineering. It proves (...) vital for their assessment of the prospects for engineering interventions and the political risks inherent in them. (3) A sound theoretical understanding of implementation is imperative for practitioners of conceptual engineering. The usefulness of their representational (re-)designs depends on respecting broadly cognitive and social constraints on the part of the target population. I conclude that conceptual engineers have very good reasons to seriously engage with issues of implementation. (shrink)

This paper explores a Rastafari perspective on consciousness development and relates this to developmental stage theories of consciousness evolution from the psychology of religion. The empirical material is from fieldwork on an online Rastafari community with global reach but run by a group based in Trinidad. The people on this particular forum align with the “spiritual, but not religious” trend in contemporary religiosity, which means they are more focused on interior questions of consciousness raising than on religious externals. This paper (...) interprets empirical material from the dialogues on this forum in light of Rastafari theorist Dennis Forsythe. It compares this Rastafari theory of stages of consciousness, symbolized by the animals Anancy, lion, and lamb, to developmental theories of consciousness evolution. These are drawn from psychology and the psychology of religion (Maslow 1970; Kohlberg 1981; Fowler 1981; Gilligan 1982; Wilber 2007), which focus on preconventional, traditional, modern, pluralist, and integral stages. (shrink)

Individuality and collectivity are central concepts in sociological inquiry. Incorporating cultural history, social theory, urban and economic sociology, Borch proposes an innovative rethinking of these key terms and their interconnections via the concept of the social avalanche. Drawing on classical sociology, he argues that while individuality embodies a tension between the collective and individual autonomy, certain situations, such as crowds and other moments of group behaviour, can subsume the individual entirely within the collective. These events, or social avalanches, produce an (...) experience of being swept away suddenly and losing one's sense of self. Cities are often on the verge of social avalanches, their urban inhabitants torn between de-individualising external pressure and autonomous self-presentation. Similarly, Borch argues that present-day financial markets, dominated by computerised trading, abound with social avalanches and the tensional interplay of mimesis and autonomous decision-making. Borch argues that it is no longer humans but fully automated algorithms that avalanche in these markets. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) seems to be impacting all industry sectors, while becoming a motor for innovation. The diffusion of AI from the civilian sector to the defense sector, and AI’s dual-use potential has drawn attention from security and ethics scholars. With the publication of the ethical guideline Trustworthy AI by the European Union (EU), normative questions on the application of AI have been further evaluated. In order to draw conclusions on Trustworthy AI as a point of reference for responsible research (...) and development (R&D), we approach the diffusion of AI across both civilian and military spheres in the EU. We capture the extent of technological diffusion and derive European and German patent citation networks. Both networks indicate a low degree of diffusion of AI between civilian and defense sectors. A qualitative investigation of project descriptions of a research institute’s work in both civilian and military fields shows that military AI applications stress accuracy or robustness, while civilian AI reflects a focus on human-centric values. Our work represents a first approach by linking processes of technology diffusion with normative evaluations of R&D. (shrink)

Christian Waldvogel's work in conceptual and visual art is about the Earth within the solar system and mankind within its world and new imaginations. Waldvogel uses mainly photography, various means of digital image-generation and processing and moving i.

An experiment is proposed to test Bell’s theorem in a purely macroscopic domain. If realized, it would determine whether Bell inequalities are satisfied for a manifestly local, classical system. It is stressed why the inequalities should not be presumed to hold for such a macroscopic system without actual experimental evidence. In particular, by providing a purely classical, topological explanation for the EPR-Bohm type spin correlations, it is demonstrated why Bell inequalities must be violated in the manifestly local, macroscopic domain, just (...) as strongly as they are in the microscopic domain. (shrink)

The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. I offer a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Proponents and critics typically accept the way the argument is framed, and only disagree on whether the premisses and rules of inference are true. I suggest that the argument involves a category mistake: it conflates two different levels of description, namely, the physical level at which we describe the world from (...) the perspective of fundamental physics and the agential level at which we describe agents and their actions. My diagnosis is based on an account of free will as a higher-level phenomenon. I call this account ‘compatibilist libertarianism’, for reasons that will become clear. Although the paper addresses a primarily metaphysical question, it uses tools similar to those employed in philosophy-of-science work on determinism and indeterminism, higher-level phenomena, and dynamical systems. (shrink)

Par sa défense de l’esprit critique et de la tolérance, son refus de l’individualisme, sa conviction que la connaissance rationnelle peut contribuer à l’amélioration de la vie privée et sociale des individus et œuvrer au développement des possibilités de chacun, Carnap s’inscrit dans la tradition des Lumières. Loin de se préoccuper exclusivement de problèmes logiques ou épistémologiques, il tient la question philosophique des valeurs pour la plus importante de toutes et reconnaît la part essentielle de l’affectivité dans la vie humaine, (...) laquelle ne saurait être satisfaite par la seule pensée conceptuelle, comme en témoigne l’expression du « sentiment de la vie » par le poète ou le musicien. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Bis zu welchem Grad ist eine mit dem Lebens- und Gesundheitsschutz begründete Einschränkung von Grundrechten und des gesellschaftlichen Lebens, wie bei der gegenwärtigen Covid-19-Pandemie, aus ethischer und rechtsphilosophischer Sicht legitim? Ethik und Recht und nicht die Medizin sind es, die in diesen Fragen letztlich den normativen Orientierungsrahmen geben müssen – was nicht ausschließt, dass auch medizinische Argumente bei der Deliberation eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Es stellen sich deshalb Fragen nach diesem normativen Orientierungsrahmen und danach, wie die Berufung auf das (...) „Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit“ und eine davon abgeleitete staatliche Aufgabe des Lebensschutzes gegenüber diesem einzuordnen sind. Hierfür ist zunächst auf die Begriffe der „Person“ und der „Menschenwürde“ einzugehen, wobei ich mich insbesondere an Kant orientiere. Es stellen sich hierbei Fragen sowohl nach dem Recht als auch nach dem Verhältnis der menschlichen Person zur Natur bzw. zum Leben. Hier ist dann über Kants Dualismus hinaus zu einer in zweifacher Hinsicht stärker „integrativen“ Perspektive überzugehen, die den Menschen als personal-leibliche Einheit bzw. als personales Naturwesen begreift und auch methodisch eine Vielfalt relevanter Perspektiven einbezieht und von der her sich auch Konsequenzen für das Verhältnis zu Viren und für den Begriff der Gesundheit ergeben. Die hiermit angesprochenen naturphilosophischen und anthropologischen Aspekte sind dennoch zugleich vor dem Hintergrund Kants normativ einzubinden. Als absoluter Selbstzweck können dabei nicht das Leben und die Gesundheit gelten, sondern nur die menschliche Würde. Vor diesem Hintergrund betrachte ich einige zentrale Argumente der gesellschaftlichen und juristischen Debatten, die im Zuge des ersten Lockdowns im Frühjahr 2020 geführt wurden, speziell zum Verhältnis von Würde und Leben und zur Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung in Bezug auf die Einschränkung von Grundrechten. Dass es hierbei eines differen-zierten Umgangs mit verschiedenen Gruppen von Betroffenen bedarf, zeige ich an den Beispielen von Senior:innen in Pflegeheimen sowie Kindern und Jugendlichen. Als Ergebnis halte ich fest: Der Schutz des Lebens ist der Würde des Einzelnen im Zweifel unterzuordnen; es bedarf einer integrativen Perspektive und eines differenzierten Vorgehens, das verschiedene Personengruppen auch hinsichtlich ihrer jeweiligen besonderen Situation entsprechend berücksichtigt. (shrink)

›Natur‹ ist von natura, und damit durch das zusammengesetzte Suffix -tu-ra von dem lateinischen Verb nasci abgeleitet. Solche Suffixe drücken in der Regel eine Tätigkeit oder ein Ergebnis aus. Sie sind nicht wörtlich zu übersetzen; ›natura‹ ließe sich vielleicht noch am besten als das ewig Tätige, Produzierende oder Entstandene umschreiben.

G. E. M. Anscombe introduced the concept of »practical knowledge« into contemporary action theory. According to Anscombe, in cases where someone’s action fails to be performed successfully, the error lies in what he or she is doing and not in what he or she is thinking, wherefore his thought is not mistaken, and thus still knowledge. But Anscombe also seems to believe that knowledge is factive, i.e. to know that p implies that p. Both claims are, however, in tension with (...) each other, because my practical mistake prevents that my knowledge corresponds to a fact. This paper seeks to address the problem this tension poses for our understanding of practical knowledge. In § 1, I describe the problem. In § 2, I review Anscombe’s own response to the problem, and point out a difficulty for it. In § 3, I discuss three other attempts to deal with the problem, and argue that they are flawed. Finally, in § 4 I sketch my own solution. (shrink)

This article investigates whether there is any place for the school of thought that is known as analytic philosophy of education in the aftermath of postmodernism, and whether analytic philosophy of education can be treated as a ‘method’, among other alternative ‘methods’, that can be applied regardless of what kind of ‘-ism’ or ideology one embraces. An additional aim is to suggest some important questions for analytic philosophy of education to take into consideration. We argue that conceptual engineering may be (...) a promising avenue for analytic educational theory if it is used with a critical intent that is more heuristic and inconclusive than prescriptively ideal. (shrink)

The meaning and validity of Kant’s Kant’s doctrine of schematism remains contested until today. In neo-Kantianism and post-War transcendental philosophy, Kant’s schematism of the pure concepts of understanding is transformed drastically. Kant’s thesis of heterogeneity is overcome by taking it back into the internal relationships of the structure of cognition. The spontaneity of thought, performing schematizations, is retained, but Kant’s project of conceiving of the foundations of knowledge in the fashion of a theory of apperception of the I as well (...) as the externality of the given and the determination of the given that goes along with it is sublated by an objective order of validity-noematic constitution and regulation. Kant’s doctrine of schematism, then, shows to be methodology. (shrink)

We seem to learn and use concepts in a variety of heterogenous “formats”, including exemplars, prototypes, and theories. Different strategies have been proposed to account for this diversity. Hybridists consider instances in different formats to be instances of a single concept. Pluralists think that each instance in a different format is a different concept. Eliminativists deny that the different instances in different formats pertain to a scientifically fruitful kind and recommend eliminating the notion of a “concept” entirely. In recent years, (...) hybridism has received the most attention and support. However, we are still lacking a cognitive-computational model for concept representation and processing that would underpin hybridism. The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of concepts by grounding hybridism in a neuroscientific model within the Predictive Processing framework. In the suggested view, the different formats are not distinct parts of a concept but arise from different ways of processing a functionally unified representational structure. (shrink)

BackgroundAt the start of 2021, oncologists lacked the necessary scientific knowledge to adapt their clinical practices optimally when faced with cancer patients refusing or reluctant to be vaccinated against COVID-19, despite the marked vulnerability of these patients to severe, and even fatal forms of this new viral infectious disease. Oncologists at Foch Hospital were confronted with this phenomenon, which was observed worldwide, in both the general population and the population of cancer patients.MethodsBetween April and November 2021, the Ethics and Oncology (...) Departments of Foch Hospital decided to investigate this subject, through an empirical and interdisciplinary study in bioethics. Our scientific objective was to try to identify and resolve the principal bio-ethical issues, with a view to improving clinical practices in oncology during future major pandemics of this kind, from a highly specific bio-ethical standpoint. We used a mainly qualitative methodological approach based on questionnaires and interviews.ResultsIn April 2021, 29 cancer patients refused or were reluctant to be vaccinated. Seventeen of these patients said that making vaccination mandatory would have helped them to accept vaccination. In October 2021, only 10 cancer patients continued to maintain their refusal. One of the main reasons for the decrease in refusals was probably the introduction of the “pass sanitaire” in July 2021, which rendered vaccination indispensable for many activities. However, even this was not sufficient to convince these 10 cancer patients.ConclusionWe identified a key bio-ethical issue, which we then tried to resolve: vaccination policy. We characterized a major tension between “the recommendation of anti-COVID-19 vaccination” and “free will”, and the duty to “protect each other”. Mandatory vaccination, at least in France, could resolve this tension, with positive effects on quality of life, or survival, in cancer patients initially refusing or reluctant to be vaccinated, but only if collective and individual scales are clearly distinguished. (shrink)

In this comment, we pick up three points raised by Ohndorf et al. (Clim Chang 133:385–395, 2015) in their reply to our ethical assessment of the German Advisory Council’s Budget Approach (WBGUBA). First, we discuss and clarify the relationship between ethics and political feasibility, highlighting that the way Ohndorf et al. use feasibility creates an unwarranted status quo bias. Second, we explain the proper place historical responsibility should have within the WBGUBA, stressing the fact that the reasons why we choose (...) one policy proposal over another matter. Third, we analyze the limited extent to which a normative heuristic should motivate an ethically ambitious policy proposal like the WBGUBA. (shrink)

Psychoanalytic practice requires articulating three dimensions (imaginary, symbolic, real) in the Borromean Knot. The Freudian symptom articulates these three dimensions with a fourth one, psychic reality. Articulation of the three dimensions in the personality presupposes their fusion or confusion in the trefoil knot. The concatenation of the symbolic dimension with the real one would lead to the loss of the imaginary dimension if the knot of the ego did not retain it within the structure. All these movements support the thinking (...) of psychoanalytical practice: the “appensée.”. (shrink)

Utilitarian arguments on bioethical issues regarding human reproduction typically start with the view that it is wrong, other things being equal, not to procreate when this would have resulted in an additional being with a life worth living. The paper takes this view for granted and examines the common utilitarian claim that overpopulation and destitution in the world mean that, in practice, this obligation to procreate, other things being equal, often turns into a (categorical) obligation not to procreate. A version (...) of this argument is defended -- a version called the argument from transfer -- according to which, rather than having additional children and care for them in order to make them happy, many people in the West ought to abstain from procreation and take care of destitute children already existing. The reasoning leading up to this conclusion raises some philosophical questions, seldom discussed in connection with bioethics, which indicate that the argument from transfer, although supporting the claim above, cannot neutralise the obligation to create more happy people as easily as assumed by utilitarians. It is argued that the argument from transfer may place many people facing the choice of procreation in a peculiar moral dilemma. (shrink)

Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition of Arrow's and Sen's social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of an individual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a single scalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representing individual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfare functions, corresponding to multiple 'dimensions' of welfare. I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence of attractive aggregation procedures depends on certain informational assumptions, specifically about the (...) measurability of welfare and its comparability not only across individuals but also across dimensions. I state several impossibility and possibility results. Under Arrow-type conditions, insufficient comparability across individuals leads to dictatorship of a single individual, while insufficient comparability across dimensions leads to dominance of a single dimension. Given sufficient comparability both across individuals and across dimensions, a range of possibilities emerges. I discuss the substantive implications of the results. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have become convinced that the best way of trying to understand human agency is by arriving at an account of identification. My goal here is not to criticize particular views about identification, but rather to examine several assumptions which have been widely held in the literature and yet which, in my view, render implausible any account of identification that takes them on board. In particular, I argue that typically identification does not involve either reflective consideration of (...) our mental states or endorsement of those states. If it did, we would rarely be agents. (shrink)

Predictive processing, an increasingly popular paradigm in cognitive sciences, has focused primarily on giving accounts of perception, motor control and a host of psychological phenomena, including consciousness. But higher cognitive processes, like conceptual thought, language, and logic, have received only limited attention to date and PP still stands disconnected from a huge body of research in those areas. In this thesis, I aim to address this gap and I attempt to go some way towards developing and defending a cognitive-computational approach (...) to higher cognition within the predictive processing paradigm. To test its explanatory potential, I apply it to a range of linguistic and conceptual phenomena. I proceed in three steps. First, I lay out an account of concepts and suggest how concepts are represented, how they can be context-sensitively processed, and how the apparent diversity of formats arise. Secondly, I propose how paradigmatic higher cognitive competencies, like language and logical reasoning, could fit into the PP picture. Thirdly, I apply the PP account of concepts and language to a range of linguistic-conceptual phenomena as test cases, namely: metaphor, the semantic paradox (specifically the Liar Paradox) and copredication. Finally, I discuss some challenges and objections to the PP framework as applied to higher cognition and in general. (shrink)

This book explores the influence of ubuntu on South Africa’s post-apartheid transitional justice mechanism, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and—in contrast to ethnophilosophy—takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously.

Aryeh Kosman’s The Activity of Being is the fruit of a lifetime of work on some of the most difficult and challenging texts of ancient philosophy.

In this note, I correct an error in List (2003). I warmly thank Ron Holzman for drawing my attention to this error, and Franz Dietrich for giving me some key insights that have led to the present correction, particularly the formulation of assumption (a*) below. Theorem 2 (speci…cally, the claim that (i) implies (ii) and the associated Proposition 2) in List (2003) requires an additional assumption on the set X of propositions under consideration (the agenda). Let me use the de…nitions (...) and notation from List (2003). Also, de…ne a set of propositions to be satis…able if some truth-value assignment makes all its members true, and, for each Y X, de…ne Y : := f: : 2Yg. In List (2003), I assumed that (a) X contains at least two distinct atomic propositions P; Q and their conjunction (P ^ Q), and (b) X contains proposition-negation pairs (i.e. if 2 X, then : 2 X, where :: is identi…ed with ). While assumption (b) is correct as stated, Theorem 2 requires assumption (a*) instead of (a). (shrink)

La libre circulation des personnes et des biens est loin d’être réglée entre les États de l’Afrique centrale. Cet échec est lié aux difficultés de la mise en pratique des traités d’ouverture des frontières signés entre les États de cette région. Cependant, le modèle d’ouverture des frontières proposé par le géographe américain Oscar J. Martinez, qui décrit le passage de frontières aliénées à des frontières intégrées, semble s’appliquer à l’espace transfrontalier que forment le Sud-Cameroun, le Nord-Gabon et la partie continentale (...) de la Guinée Équatoriale. Cette région se présente comme un exemple d’espace d’intégration sociospatiale grâce à la transnationalité de l’ethnie Fang, à l’implantation des marchés frontaliers et à la coopération décentralisée amorcée par les collectivités locales. (shrink)